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Abstract 
The paper uses a quasi-experimental situation to analyze the effects of career 
interruptions on future labor market outcomes. Data are generated by a 
Swedish program that granted career breaks to applicants until funds where 
exhausted. Comparing approved and declined (due to lack of funds) 
applications allows us to derive “pure” effects of interrupted career that are not 
confounded by selection or omitted variables. The results show no significant 
effects on working hours but give some support for increased retirement 
probabilities among the oldest workers. The average wage effect is negative 
and in the order of 3 percent 1–2 years after the break. Further evidence 
suggests that one reason for the large negative wage effects may be related to 
changes in jobs and tasks. 
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1 Introduction 
A large part of the work-force in most countries experience interruptions 
during their labor market careers. Career breaks may occur for several reasons 
such as unemployment, sickness or parental leave. There is a large literature on 
the effects of unemployment on future wages and employment. There is also a 
literature studying other forms of career interruptions where a main focus has 
been the issue of how maternal leave schemes affect the gender wage gap. This 
paper supplements these literatures by providing quasi-experimental evidence 
on how publicly funded career breaks influence future labor market outcomes 
in Sweden.  
There are several reasons why career interruptions may affect future wages. 
Most obviously, an interruption means forgone experience and thus lost 
accumulation of skills (Mincer, 1974). Moreover, Edin and Gustavsson (2005) 
show that unemployed people perform worse on formal tests than they did 
before the unemployment spell started, suggesting that human capital can be 
lost during periods of inactivity. On the other hand, it should not be ruled out a 
priori that career breaks can be spent accumulating useful human capital. It has 
also been suggested that career interruptions may send negative signals to 
employers; people that take e  g parental leave, may be considered as less 
motivated than others (see e g Albrecht et al, 1999). This effect is likely to be 
stronger in cases where the leave is “unexpected”; e  g when fathers take 
parental leave. Apart from these direct effects, there may also be indirect 
effects through reduced investments in on-the-job training before the leave.  
We are interested in estimating the “pure” effects of subsidized career 
interruptions, that is the effect for a person who all else equal, receives a career 
break. This implies that we aim to estimate the total effects from lost 
experience and other effects associated with intermittencies. The ideal situation 
for identifying the pure effect would be one of random assignment between a 
continued and an interrupted career. Obviously, such situations do not 
commonly occur, which is why auxiliary identifying assumptions typically are 
needed to solve problems of identification.  
There are three main problems that need to be addressed: Unobserved 
heterogeneity  problems arise if the people taking breaks have specific 
unobserved characteristics that also affects the outcomes. One way of solving 
this problem is to rely on unobserved components models, such as fixed- or 
random effects models. Anticipation problems arise if, for example, wages are 
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lower already before an interruption as suggested by e g Gronau (1988). This 
would lead models relying on assumptions of permanent differences to 
underestimate negative wage effects of career interruptions.
1 Finally, problems 
with  time varying selection occur if the career breaks are associated with 
external events that have an independent effect on the future outcome. In fact, 
this can rarely be ruled out a priori: unemployment is associated with job loss, 
parental leave with having children, and sick leave spells with poor health, all 
of which may have a direct effect on future wages.  
A substantial part of the empirical literature on career interruptions has 
focused on the effects of unemployment. The applied methods range from OLS 
(Ellwood, 1982), matching (Eliasson & Storrie, 2004) and sibling comparisons 
(Skans, 2004) to the use of aggregate instruments (Gregg, 2001) and 
distributional assumptions (Heckman & Borjas, 1980). All of these methods 
present attempts to separate unobserved heterogeneity from causal effects. In 
general, the results suggest that unemployment is negatively related to future 
labor market performance.   
Another strand of the literature looks at the effects of maternal leave on 
future wages. Some examples include, Arun et al (2004), Baum (2002), 
Corcoran & Duncan (1979), Corcoran et al (1983), Gronau (1988), Gupta & 
Smith (2002), Kim & Polachek (1994) and Waldfogel (1997, 1998a, 1998b). 
Stafford & Sundström (1996) looks the effects of maternity leave using 
Swedish data. The typical study uses either cross sectional variation, relying on 
observed characteristics for identification, or fixed (or random) effects 
estimation and finds negative effects on future wages from women’s career 
interruptions. 
There is also a small literature on the effects of sick leave spells on future 
labor market performance. Hesselius (2004) uses fixed effects estimation on 
Swedish data and finds a wage penalty of around 5 % for one year’s absence. 
Finally there are a couple of papers that tries to simultaneously identify the 
effects of different forms of career interruptions. These papers include Phipps 
et al (2001) for Canada and Albrecht et al (1999) that studies Swedish data 
using cross section and panel regressions. The results suggest that 
unemployment is associated with a much larger wage penalty than parental 
                                                      
1 Note the similarity to what is referred to as “Ashenfelter’s dip” (see Ashenfelter, 1978) in the 
evaluation literature. 
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leave, and that fathers are more penalized than mothers after being on parental 
leave.  
This paper studies the effects of participating in a Swedish subsidized career 
break scheme. We compare the participants with those whose applications were 
rejected due to insufficient funds. Apart from providing an evaluation of a 
career-break policy, it is worth noting that this “quasi-experimental” setting 
provides a rare opportunity to identify casual effects of career interruptions 
since the rejected applicants provide a comparison group which is likely to 
have comparable unobserved characteristics up to the point of application. 
Thus, the identification problems faced by previous studies are not likely to 
confound the results in this case. 
When studying the effects on workers actually taking career interruptions 
the focus has been on the effects on wages.
2 We believe that there are reasons 
to explore the causal effects on labor supply as well. There are at least two 
direct mechanisms through which labor supply may be affected. First, as has 
been argued by the proponents of the subsidized career break scheme studied in 
this paper, it is possible that a break may reduce the risk of subsequent 
sickness, such as for example due to stress related illnesses. Similar effects can 
influence the chosen age of retirement; if a subsidized leave is a substitute for 
early retirement, it may have positive effects on the labor supply in the future. 
Second, it is conceivable that the preference for leisure (or similarly, the stock 
of information that affects the value of leisure) is increased by a career break. 
In addition to these direct mechanisms, there may be feedback effects on hours 
worked through the demand side. If wages are reduced, for example, hours are 
likely to be affected. 
The results show some indications of an increased probability of retirement 
for those aged at least 60 but there are no significant effects on the labor supply 
of the average participant, who on average took a 10 month leave, or any 
changes in the propensity to call in sick. The career breaks did, however, result 
in a substantially lower wage (3 %). Also, in contrast to what is the case for 
hours worked, there is significant heterogeneity in the wage results. Workers 
with less experience and higher previous incomes appear to be more affected. 
                                                      
2 The main exception is the literature on the effects of unemployment where future employment 
probabilities is a common outcome variable. Ruhm (1998) also show evidence suggesting that 
subsidized parental leave schemes may affect women’s incentives to participate in the labor 
force. 
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We also find that career breaks increase the probability of changing both 
employer and tasks; however, these career moves do in general appear to have 
been in a negative direction. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the career break 
scheme under study. Section 3 presents that data and methods. Results on hours 




2  The career break scheme 
This paper studies the effects of subsidized career interruptions using data from 
a pilot scheme that ran in 12 Swedish municipalities between February 1
st 2002 
and December 31
st 2004. The Green Party of Sweden put subsidized career 
breaks on top of their agenda in their campaign for the general election of 
2000, and the pilot was part of a broader budget compromise between the 
Green party, the governing Social Democratic party and the Left party during 
the fall of 2001. This process was repeated during the fall of 2004, and from 
January 1
st 2005, the program is available nationally.
3 
In total 80 (out of 288) municipalities announced their interest to participate 
in the pilot. The 12 municipalities that were chosen to participate in the pilot 
were not chosen randomly; according to a press-release from the ministry of 
Industry, Employment and Communication they were chosen so as to represent 
the Swedish “regional diversity”. In effect, the far north and the far south, as 
well as (parts of) the two major Swedish metropolitan areas, are all represented 
among the chosen municipalities.  
The career break program subsidized workers on a 3 to 12 months leave 
during which they are granted 85 % of their unemployment insurance (UI). 
Since the UI replacement-rate is 80 %, the subsidy amounts to 68 % of pre-
vious earnings. However, the Swedish UI-system has two different maximum 
levels, or “caps”, resulting in a maximum compensation at 13,662 SEK 
(€1,500) per month during the first 100 days and 12,716 SEK (€1,390) per 
month thereafter (numbers are for 2002). 
                                                      
3 Similar “programs” are or have been in effect in Belgium, Denmark and Finland. 
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There are no restrictions on how the time is spent during the break, with the 
exception of a requirement not to work during the leave. The only conditions 
under which a person on leave is allowed to work is if the worker is continuing 
with a minor secondary job or becomes self-employed.  
According to the survey in Lindqvist (2004), 55 % of the people on leave 
were in some form of “recreation”, 15  % were caring for family members 
whereas 22 % were in some form of education and 6 % ran their own firm 
during their leave. It can be noted that 75 % of those in education did not 
expect that this schooling would result in any changes in the wage, suggesting 
that at least part of the education was consumption rather than investment. 
To qualify for the subsidy during the pilot an employee had to have at least 
two years of consecutive employment at an establishment situated in one of the 
12 municipalities. The establishment could be either in the private or the public 
sector. Furthermore, the subsidy is only granted if the employer approves of the 
career break and consent to hiring a previously unemployed replacement 
worker.
4 The replacement worker does not have to work at the same position as 
the person on leave. 
It is not obvious why employers approve of subsidized breaks. Survey 
results suggest they mainly did this to accommodate the employees’ wishes 
(Lindqvist, 2004). However, we know nothing about employers (or employees) 
in cases where the employers disapproved of the leave. 
After receiving the employer’s approval, an employee can apply for a 
subsidized leave at the local Public Employment Service (PES). The PES has a 
fixed budget (proportional to the size of the labor force in the municipality) for 
each year.
5 During the pilot the (national) budget was expected to finance 2,000 
12-months long interruptions per year. Valid applications were approved until 
the funds were expired. There were two different applications of this principle; 
in some municipalities preference were given according to the date the 
application arrived at the PES, in others according to the preferred starting date 
of the leave (Fröberg et al, 2003).  
In 10 of the 12 municipalities there were more applications than available 
funds. The fact that the timing of the application determined whether or not an 
                                                      
4 In practice, however, half of the replacement workers were not unemployed when hired. Also, 
half of the replacement workers had worked at the establishment previously (Lindqvist, 2004). 
For an evaluation of the effects on the replacement workers, see Larsson et al (2005). 
5 After the national implementation in January 2005 the budget allows for 12,000 one year long 
breaks each year. 
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application was approved generates the quasi-experimental setting that we 
exploit in this paper. One complicating factor is that one third of the people 
whose applications were declined received a break later on during the pilot. 
This was possible since the budget was set on an annual basis so that a second 
chance appeared later. We will address this problem by using the initial 
decision as an instrument for whether a person actually went on a leave.  
 
 
3  Data and methods 
We use data on people starting their career interruptions between the start of 
the pilot in February 2002 and March 31
st 2003; information on these 
individuals were made available from the National Labour Market Board. 
Furthermore, we collected all rejected applications from the different PES-
offices in June 2003. For ease of exposition we will refer to the two groups as 
assigned (approved applications) and not assigned (rejected applications). 
Data on both groups were gathered through telephone surveys on two 
different occasions.
6 The first survey (henceforth referred to as “Survey 1”) 
during the fall of 2003 focused on background questions and questions 
regarding what the respondents did during their leave or the time-period 
corresponding to the leave (Lindqvist, 2004). The second survey (“Survey 2”), 
during February 2005, asked questions regarding employment, working hours 
and wages. These responses are used as measures of outcomes.  
 
3.1 Non-responses   
Since we use survey data there are issues of non-responses. 72 % of the 3,323 
people we contacted for the first survey responded. The main reason for non-
responses was failure to contact the respondent either because of incorrect 
phone numbers or since the respondent was not accessible during the survey 
period (a more detailed analysis of reasons for non-responses is available upon 
request). Of those responding to the first survey 73 % also responded to the 
second survey. Thus, in total we have 53  %, or 1,747 individuals, that 
responded to both surveys.  
                                                      
6 The surveys were executed by two different independent contractors, “Intervjubolaget” and 
“ARS-research”. 
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We dropped 135 observations who stated other reasons than ‘lack of funds 
at the PES’ for not being assigned. The most common other reasons were ‘no 
suitable replacement worker was found’ or ‘unknown reason’.
7 We also drop a 
very small number of observations with missing background information. 
Therefore, we have 1,605 observations in our used sample.  
Table 1 shows the number of responses to the different surveys by age, 
gender and registration at the PES offices; the only background information we 
have for all individuals. We use indicators of registration at the PES 2–4 years 
before the (intended) start of career break since 2 years of consecutive employ-
ment with the same employer was a prerequisite for the application.
8 
 
                                                      
7 We have estimated our models also including those stating that their applications were rejected 
for ‘unknown reason’ but none of the results were affected. 
8 The survey data is consistent with this requirement for all but a very small number of 
individuals. 
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Table 1 Responses to survey 1 and 2 






1 & 2 
Used sample 
Assigned      
All  2,001 1,478 1,110 1,106 
Age       
<40  0.216 0.190 0.188 0.186 
40-55  0.437 0.438 0.445 0.447 
>55  0.347 0.372 0.367 0.367 
Female  0.719 0.749 0.777 0.777 
Status 730– 1,460 days 
before start*      
Unemployed  0.016 0.013 0.013 0.013 
Temporary or 
subsidized employment  0.036 0.034 0.037 0.037 
On-the job search  0.010 0.012 0.013 0.013 
Not assigned      
All  1,322 908 637 499 
Age       
<40 0.250 0.221 0.203 0.212 
40-55  0.431 0.445 0.454 0.463 
>55  0.319 0.334 0.344 0.325 
Female  0.750 0.776 0.818 0.836 
Status 730– 1,460 days 
before start*      
Unemployed 0.020 0.017 0.017 0.017 
Temporary or 
subsidized employment  0.066 0.061 0.065 0.069 
On-the job search  0.007  0.008  0.010  0.009 
Note: The reason for the relatively low number of “not assigned” people in the last column is that 
135 observations who stated that their application was rejected due to not fining a suitable 
replacement worker were dropped. *Fraction of days. Employment status is calculated two years 




3.2  Validity of the “quasi-experiment” 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of (intended) start dates for assigned and not 
assigned individuals. The purpose of the figure is to show that assignment was 
indeed determined by the timing of the application. The first panel is for all 
municipalities, but since every municipality had there own queue, there is some 
overlap between the groups. The second panel is for Gothenburg (which is by 
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far the largest participating municipality, see Appendix B) where we more 
clearly can see a separation between the groups. It should also be noted that 
Gothenburg was one of the municipalities where the application date (which 
we do not have data on), rather than the start date, was used to determine which 
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Table 2 Characteristics of assigned and not assigned 
 









Women  0.777 0.836  -0.068*** -0.045 
Age         
<40  0.186 0.212  -0.038*  -0.014 
40-55  0.447 0.463  -0.007  0.054 
>55  0.367 0.325  0.045  -0.040 
        
Married (includes cohabiting)  0.810 0.848  -0.004  -0.043 
Having children   0.495 0.555  -0.078*** -0.036 
Education        
Primary (< 10 years)  0.149 0.090  0.055*** 0.007 
Upper secondary  0.392 0.411  -0.000  -0.023 
Some tertiary  0.459 0.499  -0.054*  0.016 
        
Experience  25.1 23.1  2.696***  0.914 
Tenure  16.6 15.8  1.886***  0.312 
Full time employee  0.718 0.713  0.008  0.011 
Public employee  0.613 0.715  -0.100*** -0.106*** 
Monthly pre-tax earnings (SEK) 
a 
17,158  17,512  -563**  264   
Employment status 730- 1,460 
days before start (fraction of days) 
b        
Unemployed  0.013 0.017  -0.006  -0.006 
Temporary or subsidized 
employment  0.037 0.069  -0.029*** -0.010 
On-the job search  0.013 0.009  0.003  0.009 
Treated  1.000 0.327  0.663*** 0.709*** 
Number of observations  1,106  499  1,605  1,605 
Note: See Appendix A for details about variable definitions and Appendix B for further 
comparisons between the two groups. Corrected differences are from regressions on municipality 
dummies, in the last column interacted with a linear function in the (intended) start date. 
a See 
Appendix B for the distribution. 
b Employment status is calculated 2 years before since employ-
ment is required during the final two years. * (**, ***) significant at the 10 % (5 %, 1 %) level. 
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Our identifying assumption is that the timing of the application is 
excludable from the outcome equation at least conditional on our covariates. 
This means that whether the application appeared before or after the budget 
was expired is not directly correlated with the outcomes.  
The identifying assumption can, of course, not be tested directly. An 
informal “test” of the assumption is however provided by looking at whether 
the two groups differ with respect to observed characteristics. Some evidence 
from Survey 1 is presented as descriptive statistics in Table 2.
9 Before looking 
at the differences it is worth noting that there is a very high share of women 
and public employees among the applicants. Also the numbers for age and 
experience are quite high relative to the work force in general. A more detailed 
inspection of the most frequent occupations shows that e g assistant nurses, 
mail delivery persons and pre-school teachers are highly overrepresented (see 
Lindqvist, 2004). Overall the evidence suggests that the take up of the policy is 
mainly in occupations with low wage dispersion (even by Swedish standards). 
Differences between assigned (column  1) and not assigned (column  2) 
individuals are in most cases small but do exist. However, some differences in 
the raw data are expected since the municipality distribution may differ. In the 
third column we therefore present differences after controlling for differences 
between municipalities. We find that some of the differences are significant; 
most notably the assigned have somewhat more experience and tenure but 
lower earnings before their application. They are also to lesser extent public 
employees. These differences are somewhat worrying since they suggest that 
there may be differences between the early applicants and the later applicants 
even within municipalities.  
On account of the found differences we perform a further analysis by 
introducing a municipality specific linear function of the start date, thus 
creating a “regression-discontinuity” situation (this strategy is also explored in 
the empirical analysis below). After introducing the linear start-date variable, 
only the dummy for being a public employee is significant and some of the 
differences, such as the pre-application earnings, changes signs. Thus, the 
evidence show that, controlling for a linear function of start date, there are no 
substantial observed differences between the assigned and the not assigned.  
                                                      
9 Appendix A presents details regarding variable definitions. 
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Due to the evidence presented above, we introduce both the observed 
characteristics and a linear function of the start dates in our empirical analysis 
(see Section 3.4 below for a further discussion)  
Appendix B presents further comparisons and the municipality distribution. 
The multivariate relationships are shown in the results sections below. 
 
3.3 Outcomes 
Our focus is in this paper is on how career breaks affects hours and wages. The 
survey respondents were asked to specify the number of hours they worked 
during the previous week. If they could not give a specific number, they were 
asked to reply within specified intervals (0, 1–14, 15–24, 25–35, 36+). In the 
cases were respondents used the intervals we use the most frequent response 
within the interval instead (1, 8, 20, 30 and 40). If they worked less than 36 
hours they were also asked whether they would have preferred to work more 
and if not so, why. 
Depending on the type of contract, people were asked to report their 
monthly or hourly wages. We convert the responses to monthly wages by 
multiplying hourly wages by 165 (following SCB, 2004) and by correcting 
monthly wages for part time work. For 93 % of the sample the estimate is 
based on a monthly wage. Those with atypical contracts (e g self-employed) 
were asked about their earnings during the last month, which was corrected for 
part time employment when applicable. To avoid inducing systematic wage 
differences from differences on contract type, we include dummies for wages 
based on hourly wages or monthly earnings in our wage regressions.
10 
Data also contain a number of additional outcome variables, such as 
employment, unemployment, retirement, the self assessed expected retirement 
age, sick leaves and whether the person changed jobs or tasks during the last 
three years (which, effectively means from before the application). Definitions 
of these variables can be found in Appendix A. Descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 3 below. The differences between the columns should not be 
given a direct causal interpretation since the municipality distribution differs 
between the assigned and the not assigned. We return to analyze corrected 
differences in Section 4 and Section 5 below. 
 
                                                      
10 These dummies do not affect the results. 
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Table 3 Outcomes for assigned and not assigned 
 
Assigned  Not assigned 
Hours worked last week  26.3 28.4 
 (17.1)  (16.4) 
Employed  0.622 0.651 
Unemployed  0.089 0.082 
Times on sick leave last 3 weeks  0.484 0.459 
 (0.817)  (0.798) 
Retired if age 60+  0.252 0.125 
Full time retired if age 60+  0.286 0.125 
Expected retirement age if age 50+  63.2 63.3 
 (2.318)  (2.286) 
Wages  19,745 20,177 
 (3,773)  (3,701) 
Log wages  9.874 9.897 
 (0.180)  (0.174) 
Same job  0.874 0.953 
Same task  0.798 0.877 
Change in qualifications*  0.330 0.491 
    
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis. See Appendix A for details about variable definitions. 
*Only for those that changed tasks, equal to 1 if more qualified task, 0 if equally qualified and –1 
if less qualified. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
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3.4 Empirical  model 
We use initial assignment as an instrument for treatment (i.e. for taking a 
career-break). However, it should be noted that each municipality had their 
own budget, and thus their own “experiment”. We are therefore studying 10, 
rather then just one, experiments.  
Thus, we include dummies for each municipality (M) in our model which 
explains outcomes (denoted by Y) by a dummy for treatment (T). Since we 
found (observable) differences between the assigned and the not assigned in 
Table 2 above, our model also include an interaction between municipality and 









i i i X M S M T Y ε β γ µ λ α + + + + + = .   (1) 
 
Note that the inclusion of the (intended) start date gives the analysis a 
“regression-discontinuity” design: We are properly identifying the causal 
effects of the career break if all (potential) differences between the assigned 
and the not assigned either are captured by the X-variables or depend on the 
start date but are captured by a linear function. Note that the linear start date 
variables for each municipality effectively are identified from differences 
within each group (assigned and not assigned).  
The comparisons of raw means in Table 2 and Appendix B show that the 
assigned and the not assigned differ in some of the observable aspects, but that 
very few of the differences remain after controlling for municipality and a 
linear function of the start date. Thus, as far as this is true also for any 
unobserved differences, the model should properly identify the causal effects of 
the career breaks. 
Equation (1) is estimated using initial assignment (A) as an instrument. 
Since both the instrument and the explanatory variables are binary it is 
straightforward to interpret the results as “local average treatment effects” (see 
Imbens & Angrist, 1994). This means that the estimates measure the effects of 
a career break for compliers. In this case, compliers are those that (would have) 
remained at work unless receiving a career break at their first application. 









i i i X M S M A Y ε β γ µ λ α + + + + + =    (2) 
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Equation (2) estimates the direct effect of assignment, which typically is 
referred to as the “intention to treat effect” in the evaluation literature.  
 
 
4 Working  hours 
We start by exploring the effects on hours worked and then turn to an analysis 
of how wages were affected in the next section. Figure 2 shows histograms of 
hours worked for the assigned and the not assigned separately. The picture does 



















Figure 2 Hours worked in previous week for assigned and not assigned (kernel 
density). 
 
We continue by looking at estimates from our empirical model based on 
equation (1) where the dependent variable is weekly hours of work. Later we 
turn to other indicators of labor supply.  
 
 
IFAU – Causal effects of subsidized career breaks  17  
Table 4 Effects on weekly hours worked 
Variable First  stage  Intention to 
treat  IV IV 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Assignment     -1.674  -1.465 
     (1.792)  (1.904) 
Treatment (career break)  0.708*** -1.186     
  (0.025) (1.267)     
Age  -0.043 -11.829***  -11.901***   
  (0.037) (2.694)  (2.698)   
Age2  0.001 0.306***  0.307***   
  (0.001) (0.057)  (0.057)   
Age3  -0.000 -0.002***  -0.002***   
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
Male  0.014 4.326***  4.349***   
  (0.017) (1.049)  (1.049)   
Less than upper secondary  -0.018 0.369  0.339   
  (0.020) (1.329)  (1.330)   
Some tertiary or more  -0.025* 1.591*  1.549*   
  (0.014) (0.922)  (0.922)   
Pre-application experience   0.004 -0.182  -0.175   
  (0.004) (0.245)  (0.246)   
Squared/100  -0.005 0.084  0.076   
  (0.007) (0.453)  (0.455)   
Pre-application tenure  0.001 0.191  0.192   
  (0.003) (0.183)  (0.183)   
Squared/100  -0.003 -0.436  -0.441   
  (0.007) (0.465)  (0.466)   
Full time employed  -0.001 4.694***  4.693***   
  (0.018) (1.086)  (1.088)   
Pre-application income  0.004 0.917***  0.923***   
  (0.005) (0.331)  (0.332)   
Squared/100  -0.000 -0.002***  -0.002***   
  (0.000) (0.001)  (0.001)   
Public employee  0.004 -0.941  -0.934   
  (0.013) (0.892)  (0.893)   
N  1,605 1,605  1,605  1,605 
R2  0.62 0.17  0.17  0.02 
Note: Instrument is assignment. All regressions control for municipality (12 dummies). All 
except last column also control for (intended) start date interacted with municipality; 
unemployment, temporary employment and on-the job search (2-years before); marital status and 
having children. Income is monthly earnings in 1,000 SEKs (≈100 Euros). All control variables 
refer to before the (intended) leave. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * (**, ***) significant 
at the 10 % (5 %, 1 %) level. 
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The results, displayed in the first column of Table 4, show that assignment 
is a strong predictor of treatment as expected. None of the other variables 
significantly predict treatment, except for tertiary education which is significant 
only at the 10 % level. Overall, this further supports our notion that the quasi-
experiment is valid. Looking at the effects on hours worked we see that all 
point estimates are negative but highly insignificant. The estimates are very 
similar if we include or exclude the covariates. It could be noted that including 
the covariates increases the R-squared from 2 % to 17 % without affecting the 
estimates of interest, suggesting once again that assignment is uncorrelated 
with (at least the observed) characteristics of the applicants. 
 
Table 5 Other indicators of labor supply 
  Working 36 
hours or more  Employed Not  working  Unemployed 
Times on 
sick leave (3 
months) 
-0.067 -0.032  0.023 0.004  -0.009  With controls 
(0.050) (0.049) (0.046)  (0.031)  (0.123) 
R2  0.19 0.16 0.13  0.03  0.07 
-0.068 -0.011  0.033 0.012  -0.044  Without 
controls  (0.044) (0.042) (0.036)  (0.023)  (0.081) 
R2  0.01 0.01 0.01  0.00  0.02 
N  1,605 1,605 1,605  1,605 781 
  Aged 60 or more in outcome year (2005)  Aged 50+ 
  Full time 
retired 
Full or part 




0.214* 0.218*  0.230*  -2.658 -0.619  With controls 
(0.112) (0.114)  (0.138)  (5.111) (0.428) 
R2  0.31 0.29  0.32  0.31 0.12 
0.163* 0.212**  0.169  -4.399 -0.386  Without 
controls  (0.091) (0.093)  (0.109)  (3.888) (0.319) 
R2  0.02 0.02  0.08  0.06 0.03 
N  270 270 270  270 745 
Note: Hours and employment information refers to the previous week. All regressions include 
municipality dummies. Controls are age (with square and cube), male, primary school, some 
tertiary or more, pre-application experience (with square), pre-application tenure (with square), 
full time employed, income (with square), public employee; unemployment, temporary 
employment and on-the job search (2-years before); married and having children. All these 
covariates refer to before the application. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. * (**, ***) 
significant at the 10 % (5 %, 1 %) level.  
We have also experimented with estimating the effect on hours worked for 
various sub-samples according to for example gender, age, presence of 
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children, education, sector, experience and tenure without finding any 
significant effects, neither positive nor negative. The same general picture 
arises from quantile regressions, all estimates are found to be insignificant. 
In the upper part of Table 5 we show some results from experiments with 
alternative measures of labor supply. First, we show results for a dummy if 
working 36 hours or more and again we find a negative but insignificant result. 
We also look at the probability of being full time employed (working more 36 
hour or being absent for cause) and the probability of being unemployed. Even 
though the estimates point in the direction of a negative effect on labor supply 
they are all insignificant, thus we conclude that the overall evidence does not 
give any conclusive support for changes in the labor supply. 
Our estimates do not suggest that there are any effects on the propensity to 
take sick leave after break. The effect on the number of times on sick leave 
during the last 3 months is negative, but highly insignificant. This analysis is 
complicate by the fact that some of the non-compliers where in the process of 
completing their career breaks during the window during which we measure 
the sick leave propensity. We have tried various ways to address this, but 
regardless of “solution” the result is insignificant.
11 The presented estimates 
condition on being employed in December.  
In the second part of Table 5 we present evidence on retirement decisions. 
The model for effects on the probability of retiring is estimated for those over 
age 60 (only 3 people in the sample did retire before this age, all at age 57). 
The resulting estimates suggest that a career break increases the probability of 
retirement by 21  % with a p-value of 0.058.
12 Note that age is a crucial 
covariate in this case and it thus seems more likely to trust the specification 
including age (with square and cube). In the raw data we see that 25 % among 
the 206 assigned aged 60 or more did retire, the corresponding numbers for the 
64 individuals that were not assigned is 12  %. This suggests rather strong 
effects, but it should be noted that the numbers are based on small samples. 
Further results, show no effect for average hours worked during last week for 
this group. The table also show the results from a more speculative analysis 
based on expected retirement age. In this case, we do not find any significant 
                                                      
11 We have excluded those on career break in December 2004 and tried restricting the sample to 
those working at least one hour in December 2004, or conditional of being employed in 
December 2004. In all of these variations we have estimated models with and without controls 
for previous sick leaves. All estimates have been highly insignificant. 
12 The p-value is 0.014 if we study the direct (intention to treat) effect using a Probit model. 
IFAU – Causal effects of subsidized career breaks  20 
effects, regardless of which age group we study (the table shows the results for 
ages 50+). To sum up the evidence on labor supply for the oldest workers, we 
find some indications of increased retirement, but the evidence is not 
significant for all indicators. Even a conservative interpretation disapproves 
with the hypothesis of increases in the retirement age put forward by the 
proponents of the career break scheme. 
 
 
5  Wages and careers 
Turning to wages we follow the career interruption literature and estimate a 
wage regression and incorporate the subsidized leave. Naturally, this 
specification does not exclude the possibility of previous career breaks, in fact 
such breaks are likely to have occurred for most of the sample since the 
majority are women and many have children. The estimates aim to capture the 
“marginal” contribution of an additional career break.  
Figure 3 show the distributions of log wages for assigned and not assigned 
individuals. The figure shows some separation between the two distributions, 
but as noted above the municipality distribution differs between the groups. 
 
 









Figure 3 Wages for assigned and not assigned (kernel densities). 
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Table 6 Effects on log wages 
Variable First  stage  Intention to 
treat  IV IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Assignment  0.696*** -0.022**     
  (0.027) (0.010)     
Treatment (career break)     -0.031**  -0.040** 
     (0.015)  (0.016) 
Age  -0.026 -0.024 -0.025   
  (0.043) (0.026) (0.026)   
Age2  0.001 0.001 0.001   
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)   
Age3  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000   
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
Male  0.011 0.022**  0.022**  
  (0.019) (0.010) (0.010)   
Less than upper secondary  -0.024 -0.010 -0.010   
  (0.022) (0.013) (0.013)   
Some tertiary or more  -0.033** 0.060***  0.058***   
  (0.016) (0.008) (0.008)   
Pre-application experience   0.002 0.003 0.003   
  (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)   
Squared/100  0.002 -0.004 -0.004   
  (0.008) (0.004) (0.004)   
Pre-application tenure  0.000 -0.002 -0.002   
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)   
Squared/100  -0.001 0.005 0.005   
  (0.009) (0.004) (0.004)   
Full time employed  0.003 -0.075***  -0.075***  
  (0.021) (0.012) (0.012)   
Pre-application income  -0.004 0.005 0.005   
  (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)   
Squared/100  0.000 0.000***  0.000***   
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
Public employee  0.001 -0.014*  -0.014*   
  (0.015) (0.008) (0.008)   
N  1,375 1,375 1,375  1,375 
R2  0.61 0.49 0.49  0.06 
Note: Instrument is assignment. All regressions control for municipality (12 dummies) and wage 
type. All except column (4) also control for (intended) start date interacted with municipality; 
unemployment, temporary employment and on-the job search (2-years before); marital status and 
having children. Income is monthly earnings in 1000 SEKs (≈100 Euros). All control variables 
refer to before the (intended) leave. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * (**, ***) significant 
at the 10 % (5 %, 1 %) level. 
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Note that when studying the effect on wages the experimental set up is not 
quite as clear as when studying hours. The reason is that we are unable to 
measure the wage effects on those that do not work. However, given that the 
effect on labor supply is insignificant, this issue does not appear to be 
important.  
Table 6 shows the results from different estimations related to our IV 
model. The first stage regression differ marginally from the analysis on hours 
since the sample is different (we lose 230 observations without wages). As 
before however, the control variables are insignificant with the exception of 
tertiary education.  
When estimating the wage equations it is worth noting that the control 
variable estimates may differ from standard wage regression results for several 
reasons. First, the sample differ, we do not estimate the wage effect for a 
random sample of workers. For example, due to the cap in the subsidy (see 
Section 2), it is likely that the wage level is one of the main determinants of 
who applies for the break. Thus we have a much more compressed wage 
distribution which may explain the modest estimate for the gender dummy. 
Second, we introduce previous earnings as a covariate, thus we are controlling 
for much of the cross sectional variation in wages. Third, we introduce 
experience at the same time as age (as well as tenure); this is mostly to keep the 
same model as when studying the labor supply effects (where age certainly has 
an independent effect). 
When studying the effects of career breaks on monthly wages we find 
negative and significant estimates. The intention to treat effect is 2.2 % and the 
resulting IV-estimate is 3.1  %. If not controlling for any covariates except 
municipality and wage type, we find a slightly larger estimate of 4.0 %. Note 
that the estimates of interest are fairly similar even though this simpler model 
only explains 6 % of the wage variation whereas the model with covariates 
explains roughly half of the variation in wages. Thus, the differences in 
observables between the assigned and the not assigned appear to be of only 
minor importance for the outcome. Nevertheless, the fact that including 
covariates reduces the estimates somewhat may be of some concern (although 
the difference is far from significant). In Table 7 we thus show estimates from 
additional models to see how different sets of covariates affects the result. We 
estimate four different models: the raw mean effect (first column), the model 
including only municipality dummies (second column), a model including also 
the covariates (third column) and a model including covariates and municipal-
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ity-specific start date effects (last column). Including municipality dummies 
increases the estimates and including the covariates reduces them, while the 
start date plays no role. The results are all negative and significant. We also 
show linear wage effects that follow the same pattern: a career break reduces 
average monthly wages by around 600 SEK (or €54). For robustness we have 
also looked at the median (intention to treat) effect using a MAD-estimator, the 
estimate was significant and in the order of the mean effect (as is indeed 
suggested by figure 3 above).  
 
Table 7 Robustness of the instrumental variables model  
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
-0.028* -0.040**  -0.024**  -0.031**  Log wages 
(0.015) (0.016)  (0.012)  (0.015) 
R2  0.03 0.06  0.49  0.49 
N  1,375 1,375  1,375  1,375 
      
-519.742 -815.244**  -423.719*  -570.246*  Linear wage effect (SEK) 
(322.143) (348.046)  (238.977)  (313.702) 
R2  0.03 0.06  0.50  0.50 
N  1,375 1,375  1,375  1,375 
Municipality dummies  No Yes Yes Yes 
Other Covariates  No  No Yes Yes 
Start date (by Municipality)  No  No  No  Yes 
Note: Wage type dummies for whether the wage comes from a monthly wage, an hourly wage or 
from monthly income are included in all regressions. Other covariates are age (with square and 
cube), male, primary school, some tertiary or more, pre-application experience (with square), 
pre-application tenure (with square), full time employed, income (with square), public employee; 
unemployment, temporary employment and on-the job search (2-years before); married, and 
having children. All these covariates refer to before the application. Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. * (**, ***) significant at the 10 % (5 %, 1 %) level. 
 
 
5.1  Effects on jobs and careers 
Given that most of the people taking the subsidized career breaks have 
occupations with relatively modest wage dispersion, it is perhaps surprising 
that we find such large negative wage effects. In order to further our 
understanding of the mechanisms at hand we estimate the effects on the 
probability of remaining at the same job and doing the same tasks as three 
years ago. Effectively, this means as before the application.  
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Results presented in Table 8 show that career breaks increase the probability 
of changing jobs. We also experimented with estimating the wage effects 
separately for those changing jobs, and those remaining at the same job. This is 
highly speculative since the people changing jobs in the two groups may be 
very different. With this caveat in mind, the estimates suggest that the career 
movers without the break were much more successful than the movers coming 
from a break: we find a very large and significant estimate for the (small) 
population that changed jobs or tasks, and a much smaller effect for those that 
did not.  
 
Table 8 Effects of career breaks on jobs and tasks 
Dependent variable 
 
Same job  Wage effect 
if same job 
Wage effect if 
changed job  Same task  Change in 
qualifications 
-0.070* -0.015  -0.139**  -0.084* -0.266 
Controlling for 
covariates and 
start date  (0.037) (0.016)  (0.056) (0.046) (0.193) 
R2 
0.09 0.51  0.58 0.08 0.28 
 
-0.095*** -0.037**  -0.105** -0.084**  -0.228 
Not controlling 
for covariates and 
start date  (0.025) (0.017)  (0.053) (0.034) (0.155) 
R2 
0.04 0.05  0.24 0.03 0.11 
N  1,375 1,237  138  1,375  243 
Note: Wage type dummies are for whether the wage comes from a monthly wage, an hourly 
wage or from monthly income. Other covariates are age (with square and cube), male, primary 
school, some tertiary or more, pre-application experience (with square), pre-application tenure 
(with square), full time employed, income (with square), public employee; unemployment, 
temporary employment and on-the job search (2-years before); married and having children. All 
these covariates refer to before the application. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. * (**, 
***) significant at the 10 % (5 %, 1 %) level. 
 
There is also a negative effect on the probability of doing the same task as 
before the application. For the people who change tasks we estimate a crude 
model explaining the direction of changes in the required qualifications. We 
generate a variable with the value 1 if the new task is more qualified (according 
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to the respondent), 0 if equally qualified, and -1 if less qualified. Estimates 
provided in Table 8 are insignificant
13 but suggest that there is a move towards 
(relatively) less qualified tasks for the people on career breaks. Inspection of 
the raw data shows that the assigned both have fewer cases of upward mobility 




Since the policy investigated in this paper is fairly particular, it raises the issue 
of whether the results generalize to other populations. Furthermore, we may be 
interested in studying whether some groups are more affected than others. To 
investigate these issues we have estimated the model for various subgroups.  
The estimates are displayed in Table 9. In all cases we show the group with 
the largest estimated effect. The estimates are not very precise since the sample 
sizes are relatively small. However, in general it appears as if the character-
istics that are underrepresented in the population under study (for example high 
previous earnings, male, short experience etc) compared to the average labor 
force also are those that generate relatively large effects.  
This picture is hardly surprising; if we believe that employees and/or 
employers are rational and react on the expected effects on wages (or 
productivity) we should see an overrepresentation of characteristics associated 
with smaller effects among the applicants. It is thus likely that the overall 
estimates present a lower bound of effects for a random worker taking a career 
break.  
                                                      
13 Estimates are significant if we only include observations where the level of qualifications 
changed. 
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Table 9 Heterogeneity of instrumental variables estimates 
Restriction Controls  No  controls  N  Fraction of 
total sample 
-0.078* -0.036  Male 
(0.042) (0.042) 
283 0.206 
-0.044* -0.031  Age < 45 
(0.024) (0.024) 
486 0.353 
-0.063** -0.034  Experience <20 
(0.026) (0.025) 
419 0.305 
-0.040 -0.019  Tenure <10 
(0.032) (0.032) 
356 0.259 
-0.031 -0.064***  Tertiary education 
(0.020) (0.023) 
668 0.486 
-0.059*** -0.065***  Income > 17,000 SEK 
(0.021) (0.021) 
691 0.503 
-0.054* -0.023  Private sector 
(0.029) (0.031) 
483 0.351 
-0.040*** -0.032*  Married 
(0.015) (0.018) 
1,130 0.822 
-0.034 -0.061**  No children 
(0.023) (0.025) 
637 0.463 
-0.073* -0.101**  Working in Gothenburg 
(0.044) (0.042) 
463 0.337 
Municipality dummies Yes  Yes     
Other Covariates  Yes  No     
Start date (by Municipality)  Yes  No     
Note: Wage type dummies for whether the wage comes from a monthly wage, an hourly wage or 
from monthly income are included in all regressions. Other covariates are age (with square and 
cube), male, primary school, some tertiary or more, pre-application experience (with square), 
pre-application tenure (with square), full time employed, income (with square), public employee; 
unemployment, temporary employment and on-the job search (2-years before); married and 
having children. All these covariates refer to before the application. Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. * (**, ***) significant at the 10 % (5 %, 1 %) level. 
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A further question regarding the interpretation of the results has to do with 
how the time on leave is spent. Since we do not know what the workers in the 
comparison group would have done if they had been granted a leave this is a 
difficult question to answer. However, in order to get some flavor of this we 
tried estimating a model explaining post-leave wages by the covariates and 
indicator-variables for time spent in some form of education (23 %) or self-
employment (4 %) during the leave. The model only used the people actually 
taking career breaks and the results, should thus be interpreted with care. The 
results showed no significant differences depending on time use, the point 
estimate for self employment was positive (4 %) with a p-value of 0.14. For 
education the estimate was basically zero and very imprecise. This may reflect 
selection or that the types of education pursued during the leave was mainly a 
form of consumption. 
 
 
6 Concluding  remarks 
The paper studies the effects on labor supply and wages of being granted a 
subsidized career break of 3-12 months. The results does not indicate that 
taking a career break increases future labor supply, the only (marginally) 
significant results found points in the direction of an increased retirement 
probability for older workers.  
The results on wages are more clear-cut: Hourly wages are reduced by 
approximately 3 % by the career break. This is in the order of a yearly wage 
increase,
14 but perhaps surprisingly large given that females, older workers and 
public employees are overrepresented in the studied population. However, 
further results suggest that the career breaks led to more changes in jobs and 
tasks and that these changes were in a negative direction. This suggests that the 
effects, at least partly, are driven by a less favorable career development, rather 
than just the wage within a given job. Since the evidence also show that the 
career breaks increased the probability of changing jobs it is possible that there 
will be a catch-up over time as tenure is acquired in the new jobs. However, 
studying this would require a much longer follow up period than is currently 
available. 
                                                      
14 According to Statistics Sweden the average monthly wages grew by 3.2 % between 2002 and 
2003, see SCB (2004). 
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When interpreting these results it is important to keep in mind that we are 
identifying the effect of being granted a career break; any effects through 
signaling towards the own employer (although perhaps not towards alternative 
employers) will be washed away since both the treatment and the comparison 
group advertised their willingness to take a break. Also, characteristics that we 
typically associate with small returns to experience, such as being female, 
working in the public sector and having long experience are overrepresented 
among the workers applying for the career breaks. Thus, it is likely that the 
presented estimates are lower bounds for the effects a randomly selected 
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
Table A1 Variable definitions (continues on next page) 
Variable Source  Comment/restrictions 
Assigned/ 
not assigned 
PES register and applications  PES registered the assigned in 
official registers.  
Applications for those not assigned 
from PES offices were gathered 
manually. 
Reason for not 
assigned 
Survey 1: What was the reason 
for not being granted a leave? 
Remain in data if answering ‘PES 
ran out of money’ (84 %). 
Otherwise dropped.  
Main other reasons are ‘not finding 
a suitable replacement worker’ and 
‘unknown reason’. 
Treated  PES registers  All treated are registered. 
Municipality of 
workplace. 
PES registers or Survey 1 if 
assigned. From application if not 
assigned.  
In some cases imputed from area 
codes of phone numbers. 
Actual Start date   PES registers    
Intended Start date  
(if not assigned) 
1)  Applications 
2)  Survey 1 Q: When did you 
intend to start you leave? 
3)  Imputed from mean among 
not assigned in municipality  
Not all applications included 
(readable) start dates. Not all 
respondents remembered their 
intended start dates or understood 
the question correctly. 
Monthly Wage  Survey 2: 
Q1: Monthly wage, hourly wage 
or other contract? 
 
Q2: What was your monthly 
(hourly) wage (or earnings)? 
 
Q3: (If not hourly wage) Is that 
for full time? 
 
Q4: (If not full time) For which 
fraction of full time was your 
contract last week? 
Based on monthly wage (93 %), 
hourly wage or monthly earnings 
(if contract other than monthly or 
hourly wage). 
 
Monthly wage and earnings 
corrected for part time. Hourly 
wage multiplied by 165 (following 
SCB, 2004).  
 
Kept if >10,000 & <40,000: drops 
17 observations. 
Weekly hours  Survey 2 
Q1: How many hours did you 
work last week? 
 
Q2: (if not able to answer, 
[imputed value]): Was it 0 [0], 1–
14 [8], 15–24 [20], 25–35 [30], 36 
or more [40]. 
If reason for working less than 36 
hour is “being on career break” (14 
cases) then use reply from “How 
many hours did you work the first 
week in December?” 
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Table A1 Variable definitions (continued) 
Variable Source  Comment/restrictions 
Same job  Survey 2 
Q: Are you currently working for 
the same organization or firm as 
you did three years ago? 
 
Same task  Survey 2 
Q: Are your main tasks the same 
as they were three years ago? 
 
More or less 
qualified tasks 
Survey 2 
Q: (if changed tasks) Are your 
current tasks more qualified, 
equally qualified or less qualified 





Q: (if working less than 36 hours) 
If your own or another employer 
had offered you to work more, 
would you have done so? 
Unemployed if wishing to work 
more 
Employed Survey  2 
Q: (if working less than 36 hours 
and not unemployed) what was 
the main reason for not wishing to 
work more? 
Employed if either working 36 
hours + or absent due to vacation, 
scheduled leave or due to parental 
leave or sickness (own or child’s). 




Q: At which age would you like 
to retire?? 




Q: How many times have you 





Survey 1  
Q: What was your monthly labor 
income (before taxes) before 
applying? 
Imputed from the covariates 
included in the IV model if no 
reply (50 cases). 
Experience/Tenure  Survey 1 Q: How many years of 
work experience do you have? 
‘…with the employer from which 
you applied for a leave’ for tenure. 
Unemployment  
(history) 
PES registers  
(730-1,460 days before start date) 
Includes both open unemployment 




As above  Registered in temporary 
employment, part time 
unemployed, subsidized 
employment etc  
On–the–job search 
(history) 
As above   
Note: Survey 1 in fall of 2003, survey 2 in February 2005. Some questions have been abbreviated 
in the table. 
 
IFAU – Causal effects of subsidized career breaks  35  
Appendix B: Comparisons of assigned 
and not assigned  
Table B1 Municipality distribution of applications 
  Assigned  Not assigned 
Botkyrka   0.058 – 
Gällivare 0.024  0.108 
Göteborg (Gothenburg)  0.374  0.232 
Hultsfred 0.025  0.046 
Hällefors 0.011  0.042 
Katrineholm 0.044  – 
Landskrona   0.052  0.028 
Lund 0.119  0.076 
Piteå 0.070  0.182 
Strömsund 0.020  0.052 
Västerås 0.159  0.174 
Åmål 0.045  0.060 
    
Number of observations  1,105  500 
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Table B2 Children (before application) 
 Assigned  Not assigned 
Having children  0.495  0.556 
1 child 0-6   0.117  0.148 
2 children 0-6  0.045  0.052 
>=3 children 0-6  0.007  0.010 
    
1 child 7-16  0.152  0.192 
2 children 7-16  0.163  0.150 
>=3 children 7-16  0.036  0.036 
    
1 child 17 or older  0.116  0.154 
2 children 17 or older  0.025  0.034 
>=3 children 17 or older  0.005  0.006 
Number of observations  1,105  500 
 
IFAU – Causal effects of subsidized career breaks  37  
Table B3 Earnings (before application) 
 Assigned  Not assigned 
Monthly pre-tax earnings (SEK)    
Mean 17,157  17,513 
Median   17,000  17,500 
<10 000  0.033  0.034 
10 000-14 999  0.206  0.204 
15 000-19 999  0.524  0.508 
20 000+  0.236  0.254 
Number of observations  1,105  500 
    
Household income (if  married or cohabiting)    
Mean 36,821  36,057 
Median   35,000  35,000 
<20 000  0.060  0.044 
20 000 – 29 999  0.171  0.184 
30 000 – 39 999  0.395  0.429 
40 000 – 49 999  0.252  0.236 
50 000+  0.122  0.106 
Number of responses  820  385 
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Table B4 Sick-leaves (before application) 
 Assigned  Not assigned 
Number of sick leave spells 12 months before 
application  1.381 1.428 
0 0.424  0.380 
1   0.271  0.292 
2-5   0.256  0.290 
>5   0.049  0.038 
    
Number of sick leave days 12 months before 
application  14.794 12.768 
0 0.424  0.380 
<14 days  0.353  0.416 
14-28 days  0.097  0.112 
1-3 months  0.074  0.052 
> 3 months  0.052  0.040 
Number of responses  1,105  500 
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Table B5 Length of break (actual and intended)  
  Assigned  Not assigned 
Average career break length  (months)  9.9  9.1 
Median career break length  (months)  12  12 
Number of responses  1,105  500 
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